fix(keychain) + release: macOS keychain ACL self-repair, bump 0.8.1 (#37)

* fix(keychain): repair stale macOS keychain ACLs before reads

macOS records the trusted application of a legacy keychain item as the
executable *path* for an ad-hoc (dev/linker-signed) build, and as a code
requirement + cdhash partition list for a signed bundle. When the path
changes — the monorepo move (`src-tauri/` -> `desktop/src-tauri/`), a
reinstalled app, running the installed app after a dev build — the ACL no
longer admits the running binary, so macOS demands the keychain password on
*every* access: once per secret, every time, with no "Always Allow".

The pin only ran after writes, and writing to an inaccessible item needs the
same authorization, so the ACL was never repaired.

- keychain_acl::is_item_trusted() answers "am I already in this item's ACL?"
  with a metadata-only, prompt-free lookup (SecKeychainItemCopyAccess +
  SecAccessCopyACLList + comparison against this process's own
  SecTrustedApplication representation; a signed bundle's `cdhash:` partition
  lists count as trusted and are left alone).
- ensure_item_acl() now no-ops when already trusted (no duplicate ACL entries,
  no redundant authorization) and otherwise pins exactly as before.
- New before_read() hook, called from every keychain read path (DB password,
  SSH password, SSH passphrase — commands and internal helpers), so a stale
  item costs one authorization and is silent from then on.
- ItemSearchOptions reports "nothing matched" as errSecItemNotFound, which is
  now handled as "no item" instead of a lookup error — previously every
  connection without a stored password logged a spurious failure.

Verified: cargo test --lib (408 passed) plus the ignored live test
(`cargo test --lib -- --ignored keychain_acl`), which asserts a fresh item is
already trusted, repairs are idempotent and the secret still reads back. That
test now finishes in 0.25s instead of ~8s because the redundant
SecKeychainItemSetAccess is gone.

* chore(release): bump 0.8.1 and document GitHub-only releases

Version 0.8.0 -> 0.8.1 across every synced location: desktop/package.json,
desktop/src-tauri/Cargo.toml (+ Cargo.lock gridline entry), tauri.conf.json,
www/src/pages/index.astro, www/public/landing.js, both README download tables
(+ the MAINTENANCE note), and the version/docs-coverage/bundle-config tests.
Adds the 0.8.1 changelog entry (site + README Recent Changes).

AGENTS.md: releases are GitHub-only — tag `prod` and `git push github vN.M.N`
(origin/Gitea is a just-in-case mirror; never push branches, PRs or tags
there), and the keychain row documents the self-healing ACL repair.

desktop/package.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
     "name": "gridline-desktop",
     "private": true,
-    "version": "0.8.0",
+    "version": "0.8.1",
     "description": "An open-source, high-performance database GUI client for PostgreSQL and beyond",
     "type": "module",
     "scripts": {

desktop/src-tauri/Cargo.lock

@@ -1783,7 +1783,7 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "gridline"
-version = "0.8.0"
+version = "0.8.1"
 dependencies = [
  "bytes",
  "chrono",

desktop/src-tauri/Cargo.toml

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 [package]
 name = "gridline"
-version = "0.8.0"
+version = "0.8.1"
 description = "An open-source, high-performance database GUI client for PostgreSQL and beyond"
 authors = ["you"]
 edition = "2021"

desktop/src-tauri/src/commands/keychain.rs

@@ -25,6 +25,9 @@ pub fn get_connection_password(
     app: tauri::AppHandle,
     connection_id: String,
 ) -> Result<Option<String>, String> {
+    // Repair a stale item ACL first: after a rebuild/path change macOS would
+    // otherwise ask for the keychain password on every access (once per secret).
+    keychain_acl::before_read(&app, &connection_id);
     app.keyring()
         .store
         .get_password(&connection_id)
@@ -37,6 +40,7 @@ pub fn get_connection_password_internal(
     app: &tauri::AppHandle,
     connection_id: &str,
 ) -> Result<Option<String>, String> {
+    keychain_acl::before_read(app, connection_id);
     app.keyring()
         .store
         .get_password(connection_id)
@@ -71,6 +75,7 @@ pub fn get_connection_ssh_password(
     app: tauri::AppHandle,
     connection_id: String,
 ) -> Result<Option<String>, String> {
+    keychain_acl::before_read(&app, &ssh_account("password", &connection_id));
     app.keyring()
         .store
         .get_password(&ssh_account("password", &connection_id))
@@ -111,6 +116,7 @@ pub fn get_connection_ssh_passphrase(
     app: tauri::AppHandle,
     connection_id: String,
 ) -> Result<Option<String>, String> {
+    keychain_acl::before_read(&app, &ssh_account("passphrase", &connection_id));
     app.keyring()
         .store
         .get_password(&ssh_account("passphrase", &connection_id))
@@ -135,6 +141,7 @@ pub fn get_connection_ssh_password_internal(
     app: &tauri::AppHandle,
     connection_id: &str,
 ) -> Result<Option<String>, String> {
+    keychain_acl::before_read(app, &ssh_account("password", connection_id));
     app.keyring()
         .store
         .get_password(&ssh_account("password", connection_id))

desktop/src-tauri/src/keychain_acl.rs

@@ -1,117 +1,45 @@
-//! Keychain ACL normalization for stored secrets (macOS).
+//! Keychain ACL normalization and repair for stored secrets (macOS).
 //!
 //! # Why this exists
 //!
-//! Generic-password items stored via the legacy keychain API get a default ACL
-//! that grants access to "the application that created the item". When a Tauri
-//! app is rebuilt, its code signature changes (dev builds are ad-hoc signed, so
-//! the identity differs on every build), and the new binary no longer matches
-//! the item's ACL — macOS then shows the "Gridline wants to access your
-//! keychain" prompt.
+//! Generic-password items stored via the legacy keychain API are guarded by an
+//! item ACL. For a dev (linker-signed / ad-hoc) binary macOS records that ACL's
+//! trusted application as **the path of the executable** — not a code
+//! requirement — so the item stays readable across rebuilds *as long as the
+//! binary keeps living at that path*. A properly signed bundle is recorded as a
+//! code requirement plus a `cdhash` partition list, which is stable across
+//! versions and even moves.
 //!
-//! The fix: after storing a secret, replace the item's ACL with an explicit
-//! `SecAccess` whose trusted-application list contains exactly *this app*,
-//! resolved by `SecTrustedApplicationCreateFromPath(NULL)` — the current
-//! process's code-signature requirement. For a Developer ID-signed release
-//! build that requirement is stable across versions (anchored to the signing
-//! certificate), so items stay accessible without prompts through upgrades.
+//! Two failure modes follow from that:
 //!
-//! # Prompt behavior
+//! 1. **The path changes** (monorepo move `src-tauri/` → `desktop/src-tauri/`,
+//!    app reinstalled elsewhere, release vs. dev binary). The stored paths no
+//!    longer match the running binary, so macOS treats it as a *foreign* app and
+//!    asks for the keychain password on **every** access — per secret, and with
+//!    no "Always Allow", because the item's ACL lists only other apps.
+//! 2. **A differently-signed build wrote the item** and the pin never ran again.
 //!
-//! - Item created by this build → the ACL set is silent.
-//! - Item created by an older/differently-signed build → macOS shows the
-//!   standard one-time authorization dialog; "Always Allow" replaces the ACL
-//!   and the prompt never reappears (the same dialog the app would show on the
-//!   first read anyway — this just makes the result permanent and clean).
+//! Pinning only after writes (`after_store`) can't repair either case: writing
+//! to an item we can't access already needs the same authorization, so the ACL
+//! is never corrected. This module therefore also *repairs before reads*.
 //!
-//! All operations are best-effort: `after_store` swallows errors so keychain
-//! writes never fail because of ACL normalization.
-
-/// Best-effort ACL normalization after a successful keychain write.
-///
-/// Resolves the service name the same way `tauri-plugin-keyring-store` does
-/// (the Tauri bundle identifier) and never fails the caller's operation.
-pub fn after_store(app: &tauri::AppHandle, account: &str) {
-    let service = app.config().identifier.clone();
-    if let Err(e) = ensure_item_acl(&service, account) {
-        eprintln!("[keychain_acl] skipped for {account}: {e}");
-    }
-}
-
-/// Grant this app (by its code-signature requirement) access to a keychain item.
-#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
-pub fn ensure_item_acl(service: &str, account: &str) -> Result<(), String> {
-    use core_foundation::array::CFArray;
-    use core_foundation::base::{CFTypeRef, TCFType};
-    use core_foundation::string::CFString;
-    use security_framework::item::{ItemClass, ItemSearchOptions, Reference, SearchResult};
-    use security_framework::os::macos::access::SecAccess;
-    use security_framework_sys::base::SecAccessRef;
-
-    // Locate the item WITHOUT reading its secret: a ref-only lookup
-    // (`kSecReturnRef`, no data/attributes) never triggers an authorization
-    // prompt, so merely probing an item we can't yet access is safe.
-    let found = ItemSearchOptions::new()
-        .class(ItemClass::generic_password())
-        .service(service)
-        .account(account)
-        .load_refs(true)
-        .load_data(false)
-        .load_attributes(false)
-        .search()
-        .map_err(|e| format!("keychain item lookup failed: {e}"))?;
-
-    let item = match found.first() {
-        Some(SearchResult::Ref(Reference::KeychainItem(item))) => item,
-        // No item (yet) or an unexpected result shape — nothing to normalize.
-        _ => return Ok(()),
-    };
-
-    fn cvt(status: i32) -> Result<(), String> {
-        if status == 0 {
-            Ok(())
-        } else {
-            Err(format!("security framework error {status}"))
-        }
-    }
-
-    // Build an access object whose trusted list is exactly this app. A NULL
-    // path resolves the trusted application to the current process's code
-    // signature requirement.
-    unsafe {
-        let mut trusted_app_ref: *mut OpaqueSecTrustedApplication = std::ptr::null_mut();
-        cvt(SecTrustedApplicationCreateFromPath(std::ptr::null(), &mut trusted_app_ref))?;
-        let trusted_app = SecTrustedApplication::wrap_under_create_rule(trusted_app_ref);
-        let trusted_list = CFArray::from_CFTypes(&[trusted_app]);
-
-        let descriptor = CFString::new("Gridline");
-        let mut access_ref: SecAccessRef = std::ptr::null_mut();
-        cvt(SecAccessCreate(
-            descriptor.as_concrete_TypeRef() as CFTypeRef,
-            trusted_list.as_concrete_TypeRef() as CFTypeRef,
-            &mut access_ref,
-        ))?;
-        let access = SecAccess::wrap_under_create_rule(access_ref);
-
-        // Replace the item's ACL. Silent when we already own the item;
-        // one-time authorization dialog when the item was created by a
-        // differently-signed build.
-        cvt(SecKeychainItemSetAccess(
-            item.as_concrete_TypeRef(),
-            access.as_concrete_TypeRef(),
-        ))
-    }
-}
-
-/// Non-macOS platforms have no keychain ACL concept — nothing to do.
-#[cfg(not(target_os = "macos"))]
-pub fn ensure_item_acl(_service: &str, _account: &str) -> Result<(), String> {
-    Ok(())
-}
+//! # How the repair works
+//!
+//! [`ensure_access`] first asks, **without prompting**, whether this process is
+//! already represented in the item's ACL (see [`is_item_trusted`]). Only when it
+//! is not does it call `SecKeychainItemSetAccess` with an ACL whose trusted list
+//! is exactly this app. That call is what macOS gates behind the authorization
+//! dialog — so a stale item costs the user **one** authorization, and every
+//! later access (including after future rebuilds at the same path) is silent.
+//! Items that are already trusted are left alone, so the ACL never accumulates
+//! duplicate entries.
+//!
+//! All operations are best-effort: they log to stderr and never fail the
+//! caller's keychain read/write.
 
 #[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
 mod macos_ffi {
-    use core_foundation::base::{CFTypeRef, CFTypeID};
+    use core_foundation::base::{CFTypeID, CFTypeRef};
 
     /// Minimal `TCFType` wrapper for `SecTrustedApplication` — the
     /// security-framework crate exposes no high-level API for it.
@@ -140,11 +68,29 @@ mod macos_ffi {
             path: CFTypeRef,
             app: *mut SecTrustedApplicationRef,
         ) -> i32;
+        pub fn SecTrustedApplicationCopyData(
+            app: CFTypeRef,
+            data: *mut core_foundation::data::CFDataRef,
+        ) -> i32;
         pub fn SecAccessCreate(
             descriptor: CFTypeRef,
-            trustedlist: CFTypeRef,
+            trustedlist: core_foundation::array::CFArrayRef,
             access: *mut security_framework_sys::base::SecAccessRef,
         ) -> i32;
+        pub fn SecKeychainItemCopyAccess(
+            item: security_framework_sys::base::SecKeychainItemRef,
+            access: *mut security_framework_sys::base::SecAccessRef,
+        ) -> i32;
+        pub fn SecAccessCopyACLList(
+            access: security_framework_sys::base::SecAccessRef,
+            list: *mut core_foundation::array::CFArrayRef,
+        ) -> i32;
+        pub fn SecACLCopyContents(
+            acl: CFTypeRef,
+            apps: *mut core_foundation::array::CFArrayRef,
+            desc: *mut core_foundation::string::CFStringRef,
+            prompt: *mut u32,
+        ) -> i32;
         pub fn SecKeychainItemSetAccess(
             item: security_framework_sys::base::SecKeychainItemRef,
             access: security_framework_sys::base::SecAccessRef,
@@ -152,21 +98,260 @@ mod macos_ffi {
     }
 }
 
+#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
+use core_foundation::base::TCFType;
+
 #[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
 use macos_ffi::{
-    OpaqueSecTrustedApplication, SecAccessCreate, SecKeychainItemSetAccess, SecTrustedApplication,
+    SecACLCopyContents, SecAccessCopyACLList, SecAccessCreate, SecKeychainItemCopyAccess,
+    SecKeychainItemSetAccess, SecTrustedApplication, SecTrustedApplicationCopyData,
     SecTrustedApplicationCreateFromPath,
 };
 
+/// Best-effort ACL normalization after a successful keychain write.
+pub fn after_store(app: &tauri::AppHandle, account: &str) {
+    ensure_access(app, account);
+}
+
+/// Best-effort ACL repair *before* reading a secret.
+///
+/// A stale ACL is what makes macOS ask for the keychain password on every
+/// access, so this runs before reads: it authorizes/repairs the item once and
+/// leaves it silent from then on. Prompt-free (and cheap) when the item is
+/// already trusted or does not exist.
+pub fn before_read(app: &tauri::AppHandle, account: &str) {
+    ensure_access(app, account);
+}
+
+/// Resolve the keyring service name (the Tauri bundle identifier) and repair the
+/// item's ACL when this app is not already trusted. Never fails the caller.
+fn ensure_access(app: &tauri::AppHandle, account: &str) {
+    let service = app.config().identifier.clone();
+    if let Err(e) = ensure_item_acl(&service, account) {
+        eprintln!("[keychain_acl] skipped for {account}: {e}");
+    }
+}
+
+/// Make sure this app can read `account` without an authorization prompt.
+///
+/// Idempotent and cheap when the item is already trusted (the common case):
+/// the trust check is a metadata-only, prompt-free lookup. Returns `Ok(())` when
+/// the item exists and now trusts this app, or when there is nothing to do.
+#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
+pub fn ensure_item_acl(service: &str, account: &str) -> Result<(), String> {
+    use security_framework::os::macos::access::SecAccess;
+    use security_framework_sys::base::SecAccessRef;
+
+    // Locate the item WITHOUT reading its secret: a ref-only lookup
+    // (`kSecReturnRef`, no data/attributes) never triggers an authorization
+    // prompt, so merely probing an item we can't yet access is safe.
+    let item = match item_ref(service, account)? {
+        Some(item) => item,
+        // No item (yet) — nothing to normalize.
+        None => return Ok(()),
+    };
+
+    // Already trusted → leave the ACL alone (repairing again would only
+    // authorize-and-append a duplicate entry).
+    if is_item_trusted(&item) {
+        return Ok(());
+    }
+
+    fn cvt(status: i32) -> Result<(), String> {
+        if status == 0 {
+            Ok(())
+        } else {
+            Err(format!("security framework error {status}"))
+        }
+    }
+
+    // Build an access object whose trusted list is exactly this app. A NULL
+    // path resolves the trusted application to the current process's identity
+    // (its executable path for ad-hoc dev builds, its code requirement for a
+    // signed bundle).
+    unsafe {
+        let mut trusted_app_ref = std::ptr::null_mut();
+        cvt(SecTrustedApplicationCreateFromPath(
+            std::ptr::null(),
+            &mut trusted_app_ref,
+        ))?;
+        let trusted_app = SecTrustedApplication::wrap_under_create_rule(trusted_app_ref);
+        let trusted_list = core_foundation::array::CFArray::from_CFTypes(&[trusted_app]);
+
+        let descriptor = core_foundation::string::CFString::new("Gridline");
+        let mut access_ref: SecAccessRef = std::ptr::null_mut();
+        cvt(SecAccessCreate(
+            descriptor.as_concrete_TypeRef() as core_foundation::base::CFTypeRef,
+            trusted_list.as_concrete_TypeRef(),
+            &mut access_ref,
+        ))?;
+        let access = SecAccess::wrap_under_create_rule(access_ref);
+
+        // Replace the item's ACL. Silent when this app already owns the item;
+        // the one-time authorization dialog otherwise (this is what makes a
+        // stale item permanently silent again).
+        cvt(SecKeychainItemSetAccess(
+            item.as_concrete_TypeRef(),
+            access.as_concrete_TypeRef(),
+        ))
+    }
+}
+
+/// Ref-only lookup for a generic-password item. Prompt-free.
+#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
+fn item_ref(
+    service: &str,
+    account: &str,
+) -> Result<Option<security_framework::os::macos::keychain_item::SecKeychainItem>, String> {
+    use security_framework::item::{ItemClass, ItemSearchOptions, Reference, SearchResult};
+
+    let found = match ItemSearchOptions::new()
+        .class(ItemClass::generic_password())
+        .service(service)
+        .account(account)
+        .load_refs(true)
+        .load_data(false)
+        .load_attributes(false)
+        .search()
+    {
+        Ok(found) => found,
+        // `search()` reports "nothing matched" as an error, not an empty vec.
+        // That is the normal case for connections without a stored secret.
+        Err(e) if e.code() == security_framework_sys::base::errSecItemNotFound => return Ok(None),
+        Err(e) => return Err(format!("keychain item lookup failed: {e}")),
+    };
+
+    Ok(match found.first() {
+        Some(SearchResult::Ref(Reference::KeychainItem(item))) => Some(item.clone()),
+        // No item or an unexpected result shape — nothing to normalize.
+        _ => None,
+    })
+}
+
+/// This process's identity as a `SecTrustedApplication`, serialized.
+///
+/// For a signed bundle this is the code requirement; for a dev/ad-hoc binary it
+/// is the resolved executable path (NUL-terminated). Either way, byte-comparing
+/// it against an item's ACL entries tells us whether the ACL already admits us.
+#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
+fn own_identity() -> Option<Vec<u8>> {
+    unsafe {
+        let mut app = std::ptr::null_mut();
+        if SecTrustedApplicationCreateFromPath(std::ptr::null(), &mut app) != 0 || app.is_null() {
+            return None;
+        }
+        let app = SecTrustedApplication::wrap_under_create_rule(app);
+        let mut data: core_foundation::data::CFDataRef = std::ptr::null();
+        if SecTrustedApplicationCopyData(
+            app.as_concrete_TypeRef() as core_foundation::base::CFTypeRef,
+            &mut data,
+        ) != 0
+            || data.is_null()
+        {
+            return None;
+        }
+        let bytes = std::slice::from_raw_parts(
+            core_foundation::data::CFDataGetBytePtr(data),
+            core_foundation::data::CFDataGetLength(data) as usize,
+        )
+        .to_vec();
+        core_foundation::base::CFRelease(data as core_foundation::base::CFTypeRef);
+        Some(bytes)
+    }
+}
+
+/// Whether this process is already admitted by the item's ACL — **prompt-free**.
+///
+/// True when an ACL entry's serialized trusted application is byte-identical to
+/// this process's identity, or when the item carries a `cdhash:` partition list
+/// (how macOS records access for a signed bundle — we leave those untouched).
+#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
+fn is_item_trusted(item: &security_framework::os::macos::keychain_item::SecKeychainItem) -> bool {
+    use core_foundation::array::{CFArray, CFArrayRef};
+    use core_foundation::base::{CFTypeRef, TCFType};
+    use core_foundation::string::{CFString, CFStringRef};
+
+    let Some(own) = own_identity() else {
+        return false;
+    };
+
+    unsafe {
+        let mut access: security_framework_sys::base::SecAccessRef = std::ptr::null_mut();
+        if SecKeychainItemCopyAccess(item.as_concrete_TypeRef(), &mut access) != 0
+            || access.is_null()
+        {
+            return false;
+        }
+        let mut acl_list: CFArrayRef = std::ptr::null();
+        if SecAccessCopyACLList(access, &mut acl_list) != 0 || acl_list.is_null() {
+            return false;
+        }
+        let acls = CFArray::<CFTypeRef>::wrap_under_create_rule(acl_list);
+
+        for acl in acls.iter() {
+            let mut apps: CFArrayRef = std::ptr::null();
+            let mut desc: CFStringRef = std::ptr::null();
+            let mut prompt: u32 = 0;
+            if SecACLCopyContents(*acl, &mut apps, &mut desc, &mut prompt) != 0 {
+                continue;
+            }
+            if !desc.is_null() {
+                // Signed-bundle items store a code-signing partition list here.
+                if CFString::wrap_under_create_rule(desc)
+                    .to_string()
+                    .contains("cdhash:")
+                {
+                    return true;
+                }
+            }
+            if apps.is_null() {
+                continue;
+            }
+            let list = CFArray::<CFTypeRef>::wrap_under_create_rule(apps);
+            for app in list.iter() {
+                let mut data: core_foundation::data::CFDataRef = std::ptr::null();
+                if SecTrustedApplicationCopyData(*app, &mut data) != 0 || data.is_null() {
+                    continue;
+                }
+                let bytes = std::slice::from_raw_parts(
+                    core_foundation::data::CFDataGetBytePtr(data),
+                    core_foundation::data::CFDataGetLength(data) as usize,
+                );
+                if bytes == own.as_slice() {
+                    return true;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        false
+    }
+}
+
+/// Non-macOS platforms have no keychain ACL concept — nothing to do.
+#[cfg(not(target_os = "macos"))]
+pub fn ensure_item_acl(_service: &str, _account: &str) -> Result<(), String> {
+    Ok(())
+}
+
 #[cfg(all(test, target_os = "macos"))]
 mod tests {
     use super::*;
     use security_framework::os::macos::keychain::SecKeychain;
     use security_framework::os::macos::passwords::find_generic_password;
 
-    /// Real-keychain integration test: creates a generic-password item the
-    /// same way the keyring store does, normalizes its ACL, verifies the
-    /// secret is still readable, and cleans up.
+    /// A missing item is a silent no-op — no lookup errors, no prompts. This is
+    /// the path taken for every connection that never stored a password, so it
+    /// must stay cheap and quiet.
+    #[test]
+    fn ensure_item_acl_missing_item_is_noop() {
+        let service = "com.adrianbonpin.gridline.acl-test.missing";
+        let account = "definitely-not-stored";
+        ensure_item_acl(service, account).expect("no-op for a missing item");
+    }
+
+    /// Real-keychain integration test: creates a generic-password item the same
+    /// way the keyring store does, asserts the trust check, repairs the ACL,
+    /// verifies the item is now trusted (and that repairing again is a silent
+    /// no-op), reads the secret back, and cleans up.
     ///
     /// Ignored by default (`cargo test`) so CI/dev runs never touch the login
     /// keychain. Run explicitly with:
@@ -184,8 +369,21 @@ mod tests {
             .set_generic_password(service, &account, b"test-secret")
             .expect("create test item");
 
-        // ACL normalization must succeed on an item we just created.
+        // Fresh items are created with this build as the trusted app, so the
+        // trust check must already be true and the repair a no-op.
+        let item = item_ref(service, &account)
+            .expect("lookup")
+            .expect("item exists");
+        assert!(is_item_trusted(&item), "fresh item should already trust us");
+
         ensure_item_acl(service, &account).expect("normalize ACL");
+        assert!(
+            is_item_trusted(&item),
+            "item must be trusted after repair"
+        );
+
+        // Idempotent: a second repair must not need authorization again.
+        ensure_item_acl(service, &account).expect("second repair");
 
         // The item must remain readable with the correct secret.
         let (password, item) =

desktop/src-tauri/tauri.conf.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "$schema": "https://schema.tauri.app/config/2",
   "productName": "Gridline",
-  "version": "0.8.0",
+  "version": "0.8.1",
   "identifier": "com.adrianbonpin.gridline",
   "build": {
     "beforeDevCommand": "bun run dev",

desktop/src/lib/bundle-config.test.ts

@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
 import { describe, it, expect } from "vitest";
 import tauriConf from "../../src-tauri/tauri.conf.json";
 
-describe("tauri bundle config (v0.8.0)", () => {
+describe("tauri bundle config (v0.8.1)", () => {
   it("declares bundled pg_tools resources", () => {
     expect(tauriConf.bundle.resources).toContain("resources/pg_tools/*");
   });
-  it("version is 0.8.0", () => {
-    expect(tauriConf.version).toBe("0.8.0");
+  it("version is 0.8.1", () => {
+    expect(tauriConf.version).toBe("0.8.1");
   });
 });

desktop/src/lib/docs-coverage.test.ts

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ import agents from "../../../AGENTS.md?raw";
 import readme from "../../../README.md?raw";
 import landing from "../../../www/public/landing.js?raw";
 
-describe("v0.8.0 docs coverage", () => {
+describe("v0.8.1 docs coverage", () => {
   it("AGENTS.md marks inline cell editing complete", () => {
     expect(agents).toContain("Inline cell editing");
     expect(agents).toMatch(/Inline cell editing \| ✅/);
@@ -25,8 +25,8 @@ describe("v0.8.0 docs coverage", () => {
     expect(agents).toMatch(/Connection status indicator on cards \| ✅/);
     expect(agents).toMatch(/Move-to-folder bulk action \| ✅/);
   });
-  it("README declares v0.8.0", () => {
-    expect(readme).toContain("0.8.0");
+  it("README declares v0.8.1", () => {
+    expect(readme).toContain("0.8.1");
   });
   it("AGENTS.md marks schema CRUD complete", () => {
     expect(agents).toMatch(/Schema CRUD \| ✅/);
@@ -65,12 +65,12 @@ describe("v0.8.0 docs coverage", () => {
     expect(agents).toMatch(/Cancel long-running queries \| ✅/);
     expect(agents).toMatch(/Settings export\/import \| ✅/);
   });
-  it("README links to v0.8.0 assets in both download tables", () => {
-    expect(readme).toContain("releases/download/v0.8.0/");
-    expect(readme).toContain("Gridline_0.8.0_aarch64.dmg");
-    expect(readme).toContain("Gridline-0.8.0-1.x86_64.rpm");
+  it("README links to v0.8.1 assets in both download tables", () => {
+    expect(readme).toContain("releases/download/v0.8.1/");
+    expect(readme).toContain("Gridline_0.8.1_aarch64.dmg");
+    expect(readme).toContain("Gridline-0.8.1-1.x86_64.rpm");
   });
-  it("landing.js platform download links point to v0.8.0", () => {
-    expect(landing).toContain('const version = "0.8.0"');
+  it("landing.js platform download links point to v0.8.1", () => {
+    expect(landing).toContain('const version = "0.8.1"');
   });
 });

desktop/src/lib/version.test.ts

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ import { describe, it, expect } from "vitest";
 import pkg from "../../package.json";
 
 describe("version", () => {
-  it("declares v0.8.0 across the app shell", () => {
-    expect(pkg.version).toBe("0.8.0");
+  it("declares v0.8.1 across the app shell", () => {
+    expect(pkg.version).toBe("0.8.1");
   });
 });